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R. C. ZAEHNER'S TREATMENT OF THE BHAGAVAD GlTA 
Purusottama B1l1moria 
In the first volume of The Journal of Studi es in the 
- - . l . 2 Bhagavadg1 ta both Professors Er1c Sharpe and Robert M1nor 
have separately raised some pertinent points concerning the 
interest generated by the Bhagavadgi t a and the sorts of 
treatment the text received since it first came into the 
hands of Western scholars. I wish to follow the lead prov1ded 
by the two writers by isolating the work on the Gita of a 
modern Western scholar , and with a more l i mited aim concen-
trate on certain aspects of the Gita that betray a certain 
emphasis in the scholar's work, but which is absent in 
comparable Indian works. The •,york i n questi on is t h at of 
R. c. Zaehner: The Bhagavad-Gita with Commentar y Based on 
the Or i ginal Sources. 3 The translation provided by Zaehner 
with notes and commentary is fairly rel i able and admittedly 
1s a useful t e aching aid in Western educational institutions. 
However, so far as Zaehner's interpretation is concerned 
there are ser1ous problems , which I attempt to highlight in 
his paper . 
Zaehner may have spared the earlier Western commentators 
on the Gita for. the1r inadequate treatment in v iew o f the 
fact that comparative religion , as a discipline of study, had 
not reached the sophistication and maturity it did in the 
days of Zaehner. Indeed, Zaehner does not pay much attention 
to the translations and interpretations by other Western, or 
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Indian, scholars, whether from the pre-modern or modern 
period, save to mention a few of them in passing. 4 But then 
the question arises: what approach does Zaehner take himself? 
Zaehner argues that he is not much interested in what others 
the Gita says but in what the Gita actually says. And 
instead of going about the apparently 'fashionable' way of 
emphasising the various strands that go to make up the Gita, 
and thereby its incoherence, Zaehner prefers to tackle the 
Gita by "putting as little as possible of oneself into it ... 
(and) to consider it as a whole that should be explained by 
itself and by the milieu out of which it grows." 5 Zaehner 
suggests that the Upanisads might also be part of the milieu.-
The Mahatharata too could be usefully deployed for clarifica-
tion of some points. Zaehner also does not show much concern 
with the modern scepticism about Gita's genuine unitariness, 
and believes that it is possible to extricate the original 
text intact from the available sources. Yet he criticises 
Garbe for his attempt to extract the Ur-Gita from the 
Mahabharata and other sources. 6 And therefore it 1s no 
surprise to Zaehner that "others have tried to treat the Gita 
as a separate poem that somehow or other got itself inserted 
into the fabric of the Great Epic from which for some reason 
it has never been extricated." 7 
In the translation and rendering of certa1n nuances 
Zaehner does admit to difficulties, but he is hesitant in 
resorting to the "ancient commentators" for their opinion, 
amongst whom he names Sar'lkara and Ramanuja, because "they 
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almost invariably read their own philosophical and theological 
views into the text, however forced and incongruous this may 
turn out to be." Despite the disclaimer Zaehner does refer 
at some length to Ramanuja's commentary where he seeks to 
refute sankara's variant reading, 8 or ridicule the 'neo-Hindu' 
interpretation, or perhaps support his own understanding of 
the issue raised in a particular statement. 
II. Buddhi -yoga 
To illustrate the point being made I now move to a more 
concrete analysis of the treatment certain issues in the Gita 
receive at the hands of Zaehner. On such issue is buddhi -yoqa 
and its relation to other forms of yoga as discussed in the 
cita. 9 
Zaehner emphasises three basic Yogas i n t he Gita , v iz. 
karma- , jnana- and bhakti-yoga, but does not attribute such 
a prominent place to buddhi -yoga. (He also undermines the 
importance of dhyana-yoga , sometimes referred to as raja-
as another of the basic types of Yoga taught by Krsna 
to Arjuna; but this is another issue which needs to be dealt 
with separately . ) On the topic of buddhi-yoga , some have 
even argued that it is the central teaching in the Gita and 
that, like the hub of the wheel, it integrates the four 
limbs of karma-, bhakti-, jnana- and dhvana-yoga into a 
unified whole. 10 Others , again, have argued that buddhi -yog a 
is a part of, and subordinate to, j nana-yoga , the path of 
. 11 . But Zaehner does not even g1ve that 
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much credit to buddhi -yoga. His view is that buddhi-yoga is 
a means to enhancing one's moral strength whereby one will 
be able to cast off passion and hatred as well as good and 
evil works. He denies that it has anything to do with yoking 
one's intelligence with the Divine. 12 
It seems to me that Zaehner's failure to give an 
important, if not central, place to buddhi -voga in the Gita 
stems from his translation or rather misrendering of the 
term 'buddhi' and the consequent oversight of the implica-
tions buddhi has for the form of Yoga named after it. Had 
Zaehner seen buddhi in a light closer to the spirit of the 
text, his conclusions about the 'spiritual exercises' taught 
in the Gita may have been quite different. 
First, let us see what Krsna could have meant by buddhi 
and what Zaehner took it to be. Buddhi is derived from the 
root budh meaning 'to be awake' in the sense of discrimina-
ting, discerning and realising intelligently. As one of the 
very first mentions of the term 'buddhi' occurs in the line 
where Krsna makes reference to Samkhya as a system of 
theory (II . 39), it would not be too far-fetched to link 
buddhi with maha t-buddhi --the great principle of 
in Samkhya psycho-cosmology, where it designates the first 
and highest evolute of Nature {prakrti). In the hierarchy 
of emanations from the world-ground in the shadow of ourusa 
{Spirit), buddhi marks a level of emanation which is not 
wholly divorced from the transcendental, higher nature, nor 
wholly identical with the lower nature (consisting of the 
90 
mind or manas, the senses and the sense-objects, etc.). But 
while buddhl tends towards the higher nature of there 
is a sharp distinction made between buddhi and manas as the 
faculties of thinking and memory. 
The psychology depicted here finds an echo in the simile 
of the chariot as found, for instance, in the Katha Upanisad 
(1 . 2 . 3-4) where the body is likened to a chariot whose owner 
is the atrnan or transcendental Self, whilst buddhi is the 
charioteer, reins, and the senses are the steeds. 13 
Since this Upan1sad is closer to the Gita in spirit , it •,rould 
not be unreasonable to assume that buddhi in the Gita means 
something similar to the usage of this term in the Katha 
Upanisad. Significantly, the Katha Upanisad (III . 6.l0-ll) . . 
also speaks of a hierarchy or 'order of progression' of the 
faculties of man: from the senses to the mind to 
buddhi, the 'great entity' (mahan atma), the unmanifest 
(avyakta) the ultimately the Supreme Person The 
corresponding stanzas in the Gita (II.62-63) read thus: "When 
a man dwells on the sense-objects, attachment to them is born . 
From attachment springs desire (kama), from desire anger 
( krodha) is bred . From anger comes total 
(sammoha), from total-bewilderment disorder of the memory and 
from disorder of the memory the destruction of buddhi. Upon 
the destruction of buddhi he is lost." 
Thus buddhi , it may be surmised, stands higher and is 
subtler than manas to which belongs the power of discursive 
thinking and memory and which is itself subtler than the 
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senses. To buddhi pertains the power of discernment and 
intuitive insight which is engendered by its proximity to the 
transcendental realm of Whereas being 
part of the lower nature, has to be subdued and brought under 
the control of buddhi, buddhi itself stands between the 
higher and the lower nature and helps to illumine the mind 
It is thus the faculty of illumination or 'en-light-
enment'. Through a process of self-purification buddhi can 
transcend itself and integrate itself by itself , without the 
support from other faculties. "For the uncontrolled there 
is no buddhi ", remarks Krsna (II.66) . As it is ontogene-
tically prior to ahamkara (the 'I-maker' ), buddhi cannot be 
said to be an individual entity, though it may become 
individual in association with the lower nature. In prin-
ciple, buddhi must remian a unified whole (II.41) akin to the 
(or 'field-knower') of which Krsna speaks in 
chapter XIII. 
In a later chapter (XVIII.29-32), Krsna identifies three 
kinds of buddhi, each corresponding to the three modalities 
of Nature, the so-called viz. sattva, rajas and tamas . 
The which can discriminate between right and wrong , 
true and false, action and inaction is sattva-endowed and is 
freer than the buddhi coloured by the restless rajas-tendency 
to wander. The absence of sattva and rajas , again, leaves 
buddhi in an inert and stagnant state of darkness. 
However, as buddhi purifies itself and gains in spiri-
tual stature, it increases its 'luminosity content' (sattva 
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quality) and extricates itself from the process of emanation. 
A yogin possessed of such a buddhi is integrated and stands 
steadfast in wisdom, and to such a one the goal of yoga 
('yoking with the Supreme') is assured: "Renouncing in 
thought all actions to Me, intent on Me, resorting to buddhi-
voga, be constantly Me-minded. Me-minded, you will transcend 
all obstacles by My grace ... " (XVIII.57-58). 
As pointed out earlier, one of the first occurrences of 
the term is in the second chapter (vs. 39). What does Zaehner 
make of this and subsequent stanzas? The verse in question 
is translated by him as follows: "The ·wisdom has (now) been 
revealed to you in theory; listen now to how it should be 
practised. If you are controlled by the soul, you •,rill put 
l4 away the bondage that inherent in (all) works." Zaehner 
admits that the first occurrence of buddhi means in 
preference over 'intellect' (which is its normal meaning), 
and he adds in his notes: " ... asS (= Saflkara) rightly 
interprets it ( j;aman)." 14a Yet in the immediately following 
hemstitch the term is supposed to denote 'soul'. He refers 
us to the use of buddhi in II.41 and argues that the samkhya 
definition of buddhi as the highest human faculty 'rooted 
in nature' is not wholly adequate for the purposes of the 
? - 15 Glta. He cautiously remarks that there is something 
ambivalent about this concept insofar as buddhl "seems to 
stand on the brink between the world of pure spirit (the 
self) and man's physical and psychic nature." 16 But he cuts 
short the analysis and states that according to the Gita's 
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own definitions, buddhi corresponds more or less exactly to 
what we in the West call 'soul'. 
But what do we in the West understand by the term? Do 
we look for its meaning in the ancient Greek philosophies, 
in the Judaeo-Christian adaptations, in the Neo-Platonic 
cosmology or in the much later theosophical confusions? Does 
I 
Zaehner find parallels with Plato's VcU S and Plotinus 'tf' v ;("/ ? 
Or is 'soul' to him what it is in Christianity--where the 
notion is by no means clear or distinct?17 If Zaehner wants 
_.., I 
us to understand it in the former sense of vov S or') v "! , then 
we would expect him to stress the use and importance of the 
intellect and intuitive insight for attaining the goal of 
yoga; if the latter, then we could expect little or no 
emphasis on this 'technique'. From Zaehner's comments it 
becomes clear that he prefers the latter understanding. 
Zaehner seeks to reinforce his adoption of 'soul' for 
buddhi by referring to 11.41, and especially to the line 
buddhir-eka-eva' which he translates as 
"the essence of the soul is will." Thus he interprets 
vyava s a ya as 'will', whereas Edgerton understands the term 
as 'resolution' and Radhakrishman as 'resolute (decision)'. 
Moreover, Edgerton and Radhakrishnan do not render buddhi 
but 'soul', but take it to mean 'mental-attitude' and 'under-
standing' respectively. The line reads better as "the higher 
intelligence whose nature is reflection and resolution." 
However, Zaehner observes that it is on the strength of this 
particular passage that he has "taken the liberty of trans-
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lating buddhi as 'soul', for in the Christian tradition it lS 
the soul that is the responsible element in man; it is the 
soul that is saved or damned, for in it are both intellect 
and wil1. 1118 Not that it is both the intellect and the will 
but that in it are both these properties. In Zaehner's 
reading therefore 'intelligence' is only a function of buddhi, 
and buddhi--like the 'soul' in Christianity--is an ontological 
entity quite distinct from the spirit. One cannot say in 
accordance with this definition, as I am proposing, that 
buddhi is a cosmic intelligence that has come to be associated 
with 'lower nature' in the process of evolution. Taken as 
19 'soul' one can say, as Zaehner does, that buddhi is the 
agent of integration, but not that the integration of buddhi--
and therefore buddhi-yoga--is the goal. For once buddhi is 
integrated by buddhi one attains to brahman-nirvana (lit. 
'extinction in the world-ground'). 
The compound buddhi-yukta can thus be safely read as 
'integrated with and by buddhi' and not left merely to read 
'controlled by the soul'. Furthermore, if Krsna declares 
that buddhi-yoga is superior to karma-yoga, this need not be 
taken as an incidental comment, for he appears to be quite 
serious about buddhi-yoga: "Far inferior indeed is mere 
action to the discipline of buddhi ; . . Seek refuge in buddhi " 
(II .49). 
If on the other hand Zaehner had sought the Western 
equivalence of buddhi in X1 of Plotinus or even the 
......_ 
of Plato, the interpretation would have been quite 
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different. The fv'). of Plotinus, like buddhi, has a cosmic 
dimension and that "which at its highest reach is an eternal 
inhabitant of the world of divine intuitive thought, the 
nous ... and shares its activity and live, and its power of 
self-transcendence and return to its source beyond 
thought ... 1120 All t/ are in a sense one, though differ-
entiated (to various degrees at different levels) in their 
I 
unity I and in the eternal intelligible world in which r V-< 1 
at its highest is a permanent inhabitant, the unity-in-
difference is far more intimate, the interpenetration of 
parts more complete. "Light is transparent to light ... The 
sun here is all the stars and each star the sun and all the 
others."Zl At its highest the ljvpf corresponds to Plato's 
in its divine or godlike function which is an eternal 
untuitive unity in contemplation. Though the intelligent 
I 
principle may be admitted to be in the V"'/1 at its highest 
I 
the cosmic does not think as the mind does, but grasps 
noetically and intuitively. 
The marked parallel with the function of buddhi here is 
undeniable. In jnana-yoga, too, discursive thinking does not 
occupy a very significant role in the attainment of true 
knowledge. If intuitive knowledge is what is sought for 
through jnana-yoga, then it is obvious that buddhi plays a 
crucial part in the attainment of the same. It becomes 
difficult at a point to distinguish buddhi-yoga from jnana-
indeed they complement each other like the two sides of 
a coin. Buddhi-yoga also complements bhakti-yoga which also 
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requires the use of a discerning disposition in choosing 
which form (or which formless reality) to love and how to 
love: "To these (who are ) ever yoked and worship (Me) with 
fondness--! give that buddhi -yoga by which they approach 
Me." (X.lO) 
Needless to say that b uddhi -yoqa likewise complements 
karrna-yoqa, for one needs a discerning intellect to distin-
guish between that which is action and that which is inaction , 
and between action that is impelled by desire and that which 
is free from desire . The relation of buddhi -yoga, moreover, 
is made clear in numerous verses, such as the following: 
"Little by little he will come to rest. Making the mind 
subsist in the Self by holding b uddhi steadfast, he 
should think of nothing." (VI.25) 
Thus in the above light, buddhi takes on a different 
meaning from Zaehner's interpretation. Simultaneously we are 
led to a new understanding of the function and significance 
of b uddh i - yoq a . Perhaps one can even say that buddhi - yoqa in 
conjunction with the other forms of Yoga is a necessary--if 
not a sufficient--condition for the realisation of moksa. 
"That is the ut1nost joy which transcends-the-senses (and 
which can be ) grasped by buddhi (alone). And when he knows 
this, standing (still ) , he truly does not move from reality." 
(VI.21) 22 
III. Bhakti in Relation to Brahman, and purusot tama23 
Another important question concerns bhakti or love 
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towards Brahman. Brahman is usually taken to be an impersonal 
absolute that transcends all attributes and characteristics 
of a personal Godhead. However, if loving devotion is ex-
pessed, as it appears to be in the Gita, towards Brahman. 
does it therefore mean that Brahman is taken to be a personal 
form of Godhead, quite distinct from the impersonal formless 
'being-nonbeing' of the Upanisads? Or could it mean there is 
possibility of bhakti even for an essentially impersonal 
reality? Or, may it mean that Brahman in this context 
acquires a somewhat unique status? Chapter Twelve of the 
Gita begins with Arjuna's puzzlement as to which form of 
devotion lS better--that to the Imperishable , the Unmanifest 
(Aksara) or that to the Personal Manifest Lord, which Arjuna 
had just witnessed. Though Krsna goes on to extol devotion 
to the Personal form he does not rule out the validity of 
devotion to the Imperishable (Brahman); he merely says that 
the goal of the Unmanifest is 'hard for the embodied to 
reach' (XII.S) . But Zaehner wishes to identify the devotion 
to the highest, to Brahman the Imperishable , as being none 
other than devotion to the Personal God, which in effect is 
to say that Brahman spoken of here i s none other than Isvara. 
For, it seems, at least to Zaehner, that without such an 
identification the cita would be reduced to upholding an 
impersonal 'monistic' absolute as the highest principle for 
which, however, there could be no love . Zaehner says in his 
Gita and in his earlier work, Mysticism Sacred and Pr ofane, 24 
that there can be no love for a monistic absolute. Yet it 
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is clear that there is much talk of love in the Gita; but 
this could not have been so were the Gita to extol above all 
the impersonal Brahman of the Upanisads and of the Buddhists 
(brahma-bhuta). Thus, it seems that scholars such as Zaehner 
were hard pressed to find a figure towards whom this love is 
directed without any compromise. And to this end the personal 
form of Godhead with whom Krsna is identified is isolated as 
the 'Being' to whom this love is due. 
But another slightly variant reading of the Gita could 
lead one to the position that there is a 'highest' towards 
whom love is directed but this highest is not the Personal 
God Isvara, or at least not Isvara alone. To pursue this 
point further one would need to make reference to ourusottama 
(the 'highest Spirit'), a centrally important conception in 
the Gita to which Zaehner has not paid adequate attention. 
Zaehner is right when he argues against the wholesale 
identification of purusottama with the Brahman of monist. 
H 1 . t h 25 . ld b . t . t owever, as E lot Deu sc argues, lt wou e a mls axe o 
read some kind of ultimate dualism into the Gita on the basis 
of purusottama as being the highest category. 'It is not so 
much that Brahman, the undifferentiated, distinctionless One 
is opposed to the purushottama; rather Brahman and Isvara 
(the creative, destructive personal god) are each identified 
with It: each is a primary expresslon of spiritual being. 
While purusottama cannot be characterized totally as the 
Imperishable non-personal being, nor can It on the other 
hand be identified as Isvara without reference to Brahman as 
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the 'highest Spirit'. The text itself, it would seem, spells 
this out fairly clearly. To quote some verses from chapter 
XV, which contain an exposition of this 'highest Spirit' : 26 
There are two spirits in 
able and the imperishable. 
beings and the imperishable 
unchanging) . 
this world, the perish-
The perishable is all 
is called kutastha (the 
But there is another, the highest Spirit 
(purushottama), called the supreme Self, who, as 
the imperishable Lord, enters into the three worlds 
and sustains them . · 
Since I transcend the perishable and am higher 
even than the imperishable, I am renowned in the 
world and in the Vedas as the highest Spirit. 
(XV.l6-l8) 
Zaehner argues that the identification of purusottama 
primarily with Isvara and only secondarily with Brahman, for 
Brahman is the secondary aspect of the Personal God. If 
were to be completely identified with Isvara, then 
the puru:ottarna would also have to be identified with the 
manifestations proceeding from isvara, namely the soul and 
the changing world. But as we see in the verses quoted above, 
and in others that follow, the 'highest Spirit' is spoken of 
as transcending the individual and the changing world which 
are involved in and have evolved from the perishable. 
The 'highest Spirit', which is in a sense beyond even 
the Imperishable as it is not identifiable completely with 
Brahman, is without any fixed abode, and is described as that 
which neither flows nor does not flow: 'flowing It flows not, 
not flowing It flows', and It enters the entire manifest world 
and yet remains outside it, ruling the three worlds in their 
entirety. It can be seen that the conception of puru7ott:ama 
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goes beyond the duality of the form and formless, the higher 
and lower, the 'perishable' or finite and the imperishable 
or the infinite, the dynamic and static or the moving and 
unmoving. It is through the syncretic representation of 
purusottama that the seemingly opposite polarities of Brahman 
and Isvara, the Unmanifest and the Manifest, the Absolute and 
the Relative, the Impersonal and the Personal, the Monistic 
and Dualistic Gods are resolved and brought together. To 
turn now to Arjuna's perplexity, expressed at the beginning 
of chapter XII: ought one worship the personal, manifest 
god or better the non-personal, the Imperishable and 
Unmanifest? one might surmise that while Zaehner perpetuates 
even further the distinction Arjuna alludes to here, the text 
itself brings the two views of the highest principle together 
in the category of and to his extent represents 
Brahman as being more 'theistic' and 'personalized' than some 
of the Upanisads do. Still, however, it does not warrant in 
any way the interpretation that G1ta is a thoroughly theistic 
text, or that the mysticism of love concerns itself with 
a theistic or personal form of Godhead. 
IV. The final goal in the G1ta 
In this final section of the paper I wish to discuss 
Zaehner's interpretation of the final goal as represented in 
the Glta. On the basis of the identification that Zaehner 
makes of primarily with Tsvara and only second-
arily with Brahman, as I have just pointed out, he interprets 
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the Gita as teaching, that first one attains to and 
then, through loving devotion, union with Isvara, the personal 
God. In such a union, the individuality (soul) of the devotee 
is never totally lost in or identified with God, as God and 
soul are necessarily distinct and separate beings. What 
unites them or relates them intimately is the strong bond 
of love between the two. Thus if Krsna has spoken of the man 
of knowledge "becoming Brahman" (XIV.26) this could not be 
crucial save only as a stage preceding the final union with 
Isvara, according to Zaehner. Sankara is fairer for once at 
least, as he gives three possible interpretations or senses 
of the verses wherein this occurs. We need not go into his 
. . h 27 h ' f h lnterpretatlons ere, except to note t at ln one o t em 
he considers the possible identification of Brahman with the 
"power" (mava) or manifestation of Brahman as Isvara. Krsna 
speaks again of the aspirant as having "become Brahman"--
towards the end of the Gita, in XVIII.54. The verse reads as 
follows: 
Having become Brahman, serene-souled, he neither 
grieves nor longs: alike to all beings, he attains 
supreme devotion to Me. 
Zaehner takes this as an all important verse wherefrom he 
establishes that jnana leads to but maintains 
that the respective ends of ;nana and bhakti (even para-
bhakti) always remain different. He accordingly subtitles 
this part of the chapter 'From Brahman to God', implying 
again, that the devotee first enters Brahman--"that is 
nl.rvana too"--then attains to God. He comments, "this 
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hlghest bhakti (to God) is, then, only bestowed after the man 
has 'become Brahman'." Commenting on the last two verses 
that follow, Zaehner approvingly refers to Ramanu]a's inter-
pretation that "this 'knowledge' of God is subsequent to the 
knowledge of self as Brahman." To "enter" God means "to 
possess Him in his fulness"--and not, presumably, to "become 
God or disappear totally ln God, as salt in water," as the 
mystic philosophers would interpret the same verse. There 
is no doubt in my mind that Arjuna is here being enjoined to 
return to bhakti, or better, oara-bhakti, but that this 
'higher bhakti' is one fortified by, and derived from, a 
knowledge of Self. 28 Further, the "Me" here .:.s ourusot.ta.ma, 
'the highest Spirit', embodied as Krsna, a Splrit in whom, 
as we saw earlier, both the Brahman and Isvara are present 
and reconciled. 
"By devotion he knows Me, what my measure lS and 
what I am essentially; then having known Me 
essentially, he enters forwith into Me." (XVIII.SS) 
It would appear, therefore, that devotion leads one to 
the higher knowledge of the divine Being, of 
is, which one enters to become one with It. It must be 
stressed that this interpretation lS not the same as that of 
the monists (whoever they may be), who supposedly discard love 
and urge that the merger is with the "Absolute One." 
Radhakrishnan offers an interpretation of the two verses in 
question which sums up more faithfully spirit of the 
text than does Zaehner's interpretation. Radhakrishnan 
remarks: 
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The knower, the devotee, becomes one with the 
Supreme Lord, the Perfect Person,-in self-
knowledge and self-expression: Jnana, supreme 
iwsdom and bhakti, supreme devotion have the 
same goal. To become Brahman is to love God, 30 to know Him fully and to enter into His being. 
V. Conclusion 
We observe therefore that Zaehner's treatment of at 
least certain aspects of the Gita does betray an approach 
peculiar to his own interests and concerns, which are 
related pari passu to his views on mysticism. In his earlier 
work Sacred and Profane, 31 Zaehner tried to show 
that there a variety of mystical experiences and that there . 
is a great divide between the two basic types of rel i gious 
mysticism, as he puts it, one which has regard for love, and 
the other which disregards love altogether, opting for a 
unity or an escape or 'liberation' from the phenomenal world. 
But very rarely do these two forms combine into a unitary 
"oneness" experience. He mentions mystics who apparently had 
both the experiences--such as Ruysbroeck, the Al-Junayd 
of Bhagdad, Ibn Tufayl of Andalusia and Najm al-Din Razi. And 
he finds this represented in the Gita as well. But unlike 
other interpreters who view one of the strands as a prepara-
tory stage for the other, Zaehner is convinced that the whole 
purpose of the text is "to demonstrate that love of a 
personal God, so far from being only a preparation 
for the grand unitary experience of spiritual 'liberation' 
(the moksa or mukti of the Upanishads, and vimutti of the 
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Buddhists), was also the crown of this experience itself 
h . h . h . . . f 32 w , out must ect." What Zaehner 
is saying in effect is roughly that, a) it is possible to 
have a simultaneous experience of both unity and love; b) in 
accordance with the hierarchy as Zaehner established earlier 
among mystical experiences in which the most perfect form is · 
one that entails love for a personal Godhead, the Gita 
elevates this form over all other forms of mysticism, in-
clusing jnana and buddhi-yogas; and c) therefore the Gita 
does teach about the highest form of mysticism as 
one that goes beyond the experience of total oneness or 
'liberation'. Zaehner denies that he is reading his own 
interpretation into the Gita, or even that of Lamotte on 
whom he relies heavily and whom he quotes as saying that the 
final stage of deliverance is "union with Krishna, the 
Bhagavat", and not with "brahman", for "Krishna who had sup-
planted the brahman both in theodicy and in cosmology now 
. . ,33 surpasses t eschatology too.' Perhaps Zaehner wanted 
to say, with a few other Western scholars, that by the time 
of the Gita the Hindus had evolved towards a more enlightened 
and clear grasp of God and, leaving behind the unfortunate 
"metaphysical irrelevancies" of the Upanisads, had come closer 
to the awareness that it is through the love of a Personal 
God only that one attains salvation. And this therefore must 
be the central theme of the Gita, as Ramanuja, according to 
Zaehner, also confirmed in his commentary. In this regard 
then, Hinduism through the Bhagavad-gita, does cross the 
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"great divide" and joins hands with forms of mysticism 
peculiar and perhaps unique to Christianity and Islam. How-
ever, Zaehner would warn that if one took seriously the 
interpretation of Sankara or of his followers, or even that 
of Radhakrishnan, one would continue to believe that the Gita 
taught a form of unitary experience as the hallmark of 
mysticism, but such a one according to Zaehner, remains on 
the other side of the divide, and is promised at best an 
imperfect state of 'liberation'. But I have attempted to 
show the Gita does not fall easily on either side of 
divide; if anything, the Gita attempts to transcend it and 
comes to rest on yet another dimension of mystical experience 
as its finale. 
It might be remarked in conclusion that unless one 
attempts to view the Gita from a meta-theological perspec-
tive, with hermeneutical openness, and makes clear the 
assumpt1ons in the translation and interpretation offered 
and the judgements made about the meaning and nature of the 
text, the task of interpreting the Gita will remain fraught 
with perils and pitfalls. Zaehner does not detach himself, 
I believe, from the bias stemming from his background, and 
traditional commitments project themselves in his treatment 
of the Gita. But his work has raised many pertinent ques-
tions and has contributed to the dialogue across different 
religious systems. Therein lies its greatest merit. 
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